The effect of incentives in non-routine analytical team tasks

Florian Englmaier, Stefan Grimm, Dominik Grothe, David Schindler, Simeon Schudy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)
150 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Despite the prevalence of nonroutine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on performance, even among teams with strong intrinsic motivation. Bonuses also transform team organization by enhancing the demand for leadership. Exogenously increasing teams' demand for leadership results in performance improvements comparable to those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2695-2747
Number of pages53
JournalJournal of Political Economy
Volume132
Issue number8
Early online dateJun 2024
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2024

Keywords

  • team work
  • bonus
  • incentives
  • leadership
  • non-routine
  • exploration

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