@techreport{a8b2f3e0d96642f2a37ffcbace2ade9a,
title = "The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment",
abstract = "With regard to global or regional environmental problems, do countries that take unilateral actions inspire other countries to curtail emissions?In this paper this possibility is investigated by the use of a novel design of a laboratory public bad experiment with a leader.Twelve groups of five subjects played the game twice, with two treatments: ten rounds with a leader and ten rounds without a leader.The order of the treatments was varied over groups.A significant (within-subject) effect of leadership is found.Followers invest on average 15 percent less in the public bad when there is a leader setting the good example as opposed to a situation with no leader.Furthermore, total payoffs turn out to be significantly higher in the leader treatment than in the no-leader treatment.",
keywords = "pollution, experimental design, public goods",
author = "E. Moxnes and {van der Heijden}, E.C.M.",
note = "Pagination: 30",
year = "2000",
language = "English",
volume = "2000-102",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",
}