With regard to global or regional environmental problems, do countries that take unilateral actions inspire other countries to curtail emissions?In this paper this possibility is investigated by the use of a novel design of a laboratory public bad experiment with a leader.Twelve groups of five subjects played the game twice, with two treatments: ten rounds with a leader and ten rounds without a leader.The order of the treatments was varied over groups.A significant (within-subject) effect of leadership is found.Followers invest on average 15 percent less in the public bad when there is a leader setting the good example as opposed to a situation with no leader.Furthermore, total payoffs turn out to be significantly higher in the leader treatment than in the no-leader treatment.
|Place of Publication||Tilburg|
|Number of pages||30|
|Publication status||Published - 2000|
|Name||CentER Discussion Paper|
- experimental design
- public goods