The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment

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Abstract

With regard to global or regional environmental problems, do countries that take unilateral actions inspire other countries to curtail emissions?In this paper this possibility is investigated by the use of a novel design of a laboratory public bad experiment with a leader.Twelve groups of five subjects played the game twice, with two treatments: ten rounds with a leader and ten rounds without a leader.The order of the treatments was varied over groups.A significant (within-subject) effect of leadership is found.Followers invest on average 15 percent less in the public bad when there is a leader setting the good example as opposed to a situation with no leader.Furthermore, total payoffs turn out to be significantly higher in the leader treatment than in the no-leader treatment.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages30
Volume2000-102
Publication statusPublished - 2000

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2000-102

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Keywords

  • pollution
  • experimental design
  • public goods

Cite this

Moxnes, E., & van der Heijden, E. C. M. (2000). The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-102). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Moxnes, E. ; van der Heijden, E.C.M. / The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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abstract = "With regard to global or regional environmental problems, do countries that take unilateral actions inspire other countries to curtail emissions?In this paper this possibility is investigated by the use of a novel design of a laboratory public bad experiment with a leader.Twelve groups of five subjects played the game twice, with two treatments: ten rounds with a leader and ten rounds without a leader.The order of the treatments was varied over groups.A significant (within-subject) effect of leadership is found.Followers invest on average 15 percent less in the public bad when there is a leader setting the good example as opposed to a situation with no leader.Furthermore, total payoffs turn out to be significantly higher in the leader treatment than in the no-leader treatment.",
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Moxnes, E & van der Heijden, ECM 2000 'The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2000-102, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment. / Moxnes, E.; van der Heijden, E.C.M.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-102).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment

AU - Moxnes, E.

AU - van der Heijden, E.C.M.

N1 - Pagination: 30

PY - 2000

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N2 - With regard to global or regional environmental problems, do countries that take unilateral actions inspire other countries to curtail emissions?In this paper this possibility is investigated by the use of a novel design of a laboratory public bad experiment with a leader.Twelve groups of five subjects played the game twice, with two treatments: ten rounds with a leader and ten rounds without a leader.The order of the treatments was varied over groups.A significant (within-subject) effect of leadership is found.Followers invest on average 15 percent less in the public bad when there is a leader setting the good example as opposed to a situation with no leader.Furthermore, total payoffs turn out to be significantly higher in the leader treatment than in the no-leader treatment.

AB - With regard to global or regional environmental problems, do countries that take unilateral actions inspire other countries to curtail emissions?In this paper this possibility is investigated by the use of a novel design of a laboratory public bad experiment with a leader.Twelve groups of five subjects played the game twice, with two treatments: ten rounds with a leader and ten rounds without a leader.The order of the treatments was varied over groups.A significant (within-subject) effect of leadership is found.Followers invest on average 15 percent less in the public bad when there is a leader setting the good example as opposed to a situation with no leader.Furthermore, total payoffs turn out to be significantly higher in the leader treatment than in the no-leader treatment.

KW - pollution

KW - experimental design

KW - public goods

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2000-102

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment

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Moxnes E, van der Heijden ECM. The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper).