@techreport{d62b421d8dc2445f8bb2a4cbdfe7e5d7,
title = "The Effectiveness of Caps on Political Lobbying",
abstract = "In this paper, we analyze a lobby game, modelled as an all-pay auction in which interest groups submit bids in order to obtain a political prize.The bids are restricted to be below a cap imposed by the government.For both an incomplete and a complete information setting we show the following results. While ex post a lower cap may lead to higher lobbying expenditures, ex ante a lower cap always implies lower expected total lobbying expenditures.The incompletely informed government maximizes social welfare by implementing a cap equal to zero.",
keywords = "lobbying, auctions, game theory",
author = "M. Matejka and A.M. Onderstal and {De Waegenaere}, A.M.B.",
note = "Pagination: 25",
year = "2002",
language = "English",
volume = "2002-44",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Accounting",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Accounting",
}