Abstract
Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but also render teams' identity and image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a nonroutine task and identify the importance of these behavioral aspects. In a field experiment (n > 1,700 participants), we vary the salience of team identity, social image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased salience of team identity does not improve performance. Social image motivates the top performers. Additional monetary incentives improve all teams' outcomes without crowding out teams' willingness to explore or perform similar tasks again.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 921-948 |
Number of pages | 28 |
Journal | Journal of Labor Economics |
Volume | 42 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2024 |
Keywords
- Field experiment
- Social identity
- Incentives
- Performance
- Competition
- Creativity
- Contests
- Gender
- Prizes
- Awards