Abstract
ABSTRACT
The stress test of the European Central Bank has become one of
the primary regulatory tools for the European banking system. In
order to make such a regulatory indicator, different national banks
need to be commensurated. They need to be made comparable
according to a common metric. Despite a substantive literature,
little empirical work has been done to further our understanding
of the social and political processes through which these indicators
are made. We use Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to enrich the
existing literature with an in-depth account of how commensuration
is negotiated. We find that despite a preference for commensuration,
regulators allow ‘incommensurable’ categories to exist
due to largely unrecognized regulatory benefits.
The stress test of the European Central Bank has become one of
the primary regulatory tools for the European banking system. In
order to make such a regulatory indicator, different national banks
need to be commensurated. They need to be made comparable
according to a common metric. Despite a substantive literature,
little empirical work has been done to further our understanding
of the social and political processes through which these indicators
are made. We use Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to enrich the
existing literature with an in-depth account of how commensuration
is negotiated. We find that despite a preference for commensuration,
regulators allow ‘incommensurable’ categories to exist
due to largely unrecognized regulatory benefits.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 285-302 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Critical Policy Studies |
Volume | 14 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 20 Mar 2019 |
Externally published | Yes |