The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium under Moral Hazard

R. Calcagno, W.B. Wagner

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

In this paper we study the constrained efficiency of a stock market equilibrium under moral hazard.We extend a standard general equilbrium framework (Magill and Quinzii (1999) and (2002)) to allow for a more general initial ownership distribution.We show that the market allocation is constrained efficient only if in each firm the entrepreneur who generates payoffs through unobservable effort has full initial property rights to his firm.This result holds even if the market can anticipate correctly the optimal effort choice of each entrepreneur from their observable financing decisions.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherFinance
Number of pages10
Volume2003-107
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2003-107

Fingerprint

Entrepreneurs
Stock market
Moral hazard
Market equilibrium
Inefficiency
Ownership
Financing decisions
Constrained efficiency
Property rights

Keywords

  • stock markets
  • moral hazard
  • general equilibrium
  • efficiency
  • allocation

Cite this

Calcagno, R., & Wagner, W. B. (2003). The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium under Moral Hazard. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-107). Tilburg: Finance.
Calcagno, R. ; Wagner, W.B. / The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium under Moral Hazard. Tilburg : Finance, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Calcagno, R & Wagner, WB 2003 'The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium under Moral Hazard' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2003-107, Finance, Tilburg.

The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium under Moral Hazard. / Calcagno, R.; Wagner, W.B.

Tilburg : Finance, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-107).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Calcagno R, Wagner WB. The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium under Moral Hazard. Tilburg: Finance. 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).