The interest of reason is to go without God

Jacobi's Polemic against philosophical theology

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Jacobi’s polemics against philosophical theology is meant to show that neither Spinoza, nor Kant, nor Fichte and Schelling have been able to think God as a person, that is as a free, intelligent being. In order to elucidate Jacobi’s position I focus on two less well-known texts of his, viz., A Few Comments Concerning Pious Fraud (1788) and Of Divine Things and Their Revelation (1811). In the second section I situate two key philosophical theological concepts – deism and theism – against the broader context of modern philosophy. The third section analyses Jacobi’s polemic against deism, followed by an examination of his positive attitude towards theism and an explanation of the reasons why he, at the end of his life, came to identify theism with deism and extended the negative meaning of the latter term to the former. In the final section, I give an outline of Jacobi’s alternative idea of philosophical theology.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)20-34
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Religious History
Volume38
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

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Philosophical Theology
Deity
Deism
Theism
Immanuel Kant
Revelation
Positive Attitudes
Baruch Spinoza
End of Life
Person
Modern philosophy
Johann Gottlieb Fichte
Fraud

Cite this

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abstract = "Jacobi’s polemics against philosophical theology is meant to show that neither Spinoza, nor Kant, nor Fichte and Schelling have been able to think God as a person, that is as a free, intelligent being. In order to elucidate Jacobi’s position I focus on two less well-known texts of his, viz., A Few Comments Concerning Pious Fraud (1788) and Of Divine Things and Their Revelation (1811). In the second section I situate two key philosophical theological concepts – deism and theism – against the broader context of modern philosophy. The third section analyses Jacobi’s polemic against deism, followed by an examination of his positive attitude towards theism and an explanation of the reasons why he, at the end of his life, came to identify theism with deism and extended the negative meaning of the latter term to the former. In the final section, I give an outline of Jacobi’s alternative idea of philosophical theology.",
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The interest of reason is to go without God : Jacobi's Polemic against philosophical theology. / Jonkers, P.

In: Journal of Religious History, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2014, p. 20-34.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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