### Abstract

Original language | English |
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Publisher | Unknown Publisher |

Number of pages | 17 |

Volume | FEW 663 |

Publication status | Published - 1994 |

### Publication series

Name | Research memorandum / Tilburg University, Department of Economics |
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Volume | FEW 663 |

### Fingerprint

### Keywords

- Game Theory
- Location Theory
- Nash Equilibrium
- Price Competition
- game theory

### Cite this

*The location model with two periods of price competition*. (Research memorandum / Tilburg University, Department of Economics; Vol. FEW 663). Unknown Publisher.

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*The location model with two periods of price competition*. Research memorandum / Tilburg University, Department of Economics, vol. FEW 663, vol. FEW 663, Unknown Publisher.

**The location model with two periods of price competition.** / Webers, H.M.

Research output: Book/Report › Report › Professional

TY - BOOK

T1 - The location model with two periods of price competition

AU - Webers, H.M.

N1 - Pagination: 17

PY - 1994

Y1 - 1994

N2 - In this paper we characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of a location-then-price game where firms first choose locations and after that compete for prices in two subsequent periods. Locations are thus seen as long term commitments. There are two types of consumers, each with different valuations for the variants offered by the firms. Due to changes in the fractions of the consumer types, competition in both periods differs. Firms anticipate that their location choice in uences price competition in both periods and therefore maximize their lifetime profit. Although we cannot give explicit expressions for the firms' location choices, we can prove the existence of a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

AB - In this paper we characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of a location-then-price game where firms first choose locations and after that compete for prices in two subsequent periods. Locations are thus seen as long term commitments. There are two types of consumers, each with different valuations for the variants offered by the firms. Due to changes in the fractions of the consumer types, competition in both periods differs. Firms anticipate that their location choice in uences price competition in both periods and therefore maximize their lifetime profit. Although we cannot give explicit expressions for the firms' location choices, we can prove the existence of a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

KW - Game Theory

KW - Location Theory

KW - Nash Equilibrium

KW - Price Competition

KW - game theory

M3 - Report

VL - FEW 663

T3 - Research memorandum / Tilburg University, Department of Economics

BT - The location model with two periods of price competition

PB - Unknown Publisher

ER -