Recent instances of improper exercise of discretion by governors of Indian states have once again underscored the need for a critical appraisal of the manner in which such governors are appointed and removed under the Indian Constitution. The gulf between what the role of a governor was envisaged to be by the Constituent Assembly and what has actually played out in reality is a matter of grave concern. It would not be wise for us to expect the legislature to provide any solution to this problem, since the prevailing scenario plays to the advantage of whichever party holds the reins at the Centre. The judgement of the Supreme Court of India in the B. P. Singhal case made some important interventions as far as this vexed issue is concerned. However, the much-needed panacea to the ills of the process of appointment and removal of governors is still eagerly awaited. In this article, we recommend that the Supreme Court of India adopts a more contextualised approach to solving this intractable problem and considers adopting the ‘nudge theory’ to provide a framework to encourage important actors in this context to take more responsible and fair decisions in order to protect and preserve the democratic structures.