Abstract
This paper studies the nucleolus of graph-restricted games as an alternative for the Shapley value to evaluate communication situations. We focus on the inheritance of properties of cooperative games related to the nucleolus: balancedness (the nucleolus is in the core), compromise stability and strong compromise admissibility (these properties allow for a direct, closed formula for the nucleolus). We characterize the families of graphs for which the graph-restricted games inherit these properties from the underlying games. Moreover,
for each of these properties, we characterize the family of graphs for which the nucleolus is invariant.
for each of these properties, we characterize the family of graphs for which the nucleolus is invariant.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | CentER, Center for Economic Research |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Volume | 2019-008 |
| Publication status | Published - 20 Mar 2019 |
Publication series
| Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2019-008 |
Keywords
- nucleolus
- communication situations
- graph-restricted game
- inheritance of properties
- compromise stability
- strong compromise admissibility
- invariance