@techreport{b71b472bad83489d86f407f9629e26f4,
title = "The Nucleolus as a Consistent Power Index in Noncooerative Majority Games",
abstract = "This paper studies noncooperative bargaining with random proposers in proper single games. A power index is called consistent if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game with random proposers using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses the balancedness result in Kohlberg (1971) reinterpreting the balancing wieghts as mixed strategies.",
keywords = "noncooperative bargaining, random proposers, nucleolus, consistency, balancedness",
author = "M.P. Montero",
note = "Pagination: 21",
year = "2001",
language = "English",
volume = "2001-39",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",
}