The Nucleolus as a Consistent Power Index in Noncooerative Majority Games

M.P. Montero

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Abstract

This paper studies noncooperative bargaining with random proposers in proper single games. A power index is called consistent if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game with random proposers using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses the balancedness result in Kohlberg (1971) reinterpreting the balancing wieghts as mixed strategies.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages21
Volume2001-39
Publication statusPublished - 2001

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2001-39

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Keywords

  • noncooperative bargaining
  • random proposers
  • nucleolus
  • consistency
  • balancedness

Cite this

Montero, M. P. (2001). The Nucleolus as a Consistent Power Index in Noncooerative Majority Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2001-39). Microeconomics.