Abstract
This thesis explores the interactive and self-involving imaginative experiences that are offered by videogames, which have often been overlooked in philosophical discussion on fiction. Specifically, it is an investigation of the distinct ways in which such experiences can evoke emotions, actions, and desires towards fictional gameworlds. The aim is to discuss, re-examine, and modify the way philosophers of fiction have conceptualized the imaginative experience of fiction in light of the interactive fiction experience. In chapter one, I show how videogames can be defined as works of fiction according to both Walton’s make-believe account of fiction (1990), and fiction definitions that are based on authorial intention (cf. Currie 1990; Stock 2017). Ultimately, however, I argue that the interesting question when investigating the relation between fiction, emotions, and actions is not whether videogames are works of fiction, but whether players experience them as fiction. I conclude this chapter by applying Walton’s fiction theory to describe videogames as offering fiction experiences. In chapter two, I elaborate on the role of imagination in the videogame experience. More specifically, I argue against the claims that fiction appreciators need not imagine what they can already perceive (Matravers 2014) and that imagination is not necessary for players to feel immersed in videogame worlds (Gooskens 2012). In the last part of this chapter, I make use of Stock’s theory on fiction (2016) to show that videogames (and AR and VR games) present fictional content, even if some of that content is also believed or perceived to be true by players. In chapter three, I discuss the paradox of fiction, or the question how we can be emotionally moved by fictional characters and events, while we know they do not actually exist (Radford 1975). Based on a description of the particularities of emotional experiences of videogame fiction, I reassess and show the inadequacy of the three most influential solutions to this paradox (the illusion theory, make-believe theory, and thought theory). At the end of this chapter, I also discuss the emotions evoked by the non-fictional, gameplay elements of videogames. I argue that they originate in a specific ludic attitude, which I compare and contrast to the make-believe attitude of f iction consumers. In chapter four, I discuss the so-called paradox of interactive fiction, or the question how we can perform actions towards characters, events, and objects we know to be f ictional. I first describe the three claims that make up this paradox: 1) it is impossible to act on fictional objects, 2) (many) videogame objects are fictional, and 3) players act on videogame objects. I then discuss two possible solutions to this paradox. A first one consists in saying that the game objects at which player actions are aimed are not fictional, but rather virtual, or real, computer-generated objects (Aarseth 2007: Sageng 2012; Chalmers 2017). I will defend a second solution, which is based on Walton’s make-believe theory, and consists in the claim that we can only fictionally interact with fictional objects.
In chapter five, I elaborate on two concepts that are crucial to solving the paradox of interactive fiction: fictional actions and imaginative desires. First of all, I specify what it means for works of fiction to involve their appreciators within the fictional world they present. In light of my description of this imaginative involvement, I then reassess discussions on actions and desires towards fiction, modify the concepts of fictional actions and imaginative desires, and show how useful these concepts can be to describe the interactive fiction experience. Finally, in the conclusion to this thesis, I distinguish between different categories of fiction experiences, based on their interactivity and the way they involve their appreciator. For each of these categories, I specify in which way appreciators deal with the presented fictional world, how imagination is involved, and in what ways the appreciator’s emotions, desires, and actions are part of the fiction experience.
In chapter five, I elaborate on two concepts that are crucial to solving the paradox of interactive fiction: fictional actions and imaginative desires. First of all, I specify what it means for works of fiction to involve their appreciators within the fictional world they present. In light of my description of this imaginative involvement, I then reassess discussions on actions and desires towards fiction, modify the concepts of fictional actions and imaginative desires, and show how useful these concepts can be to describe the interactive fiction experience. Finally, in the conclusion to this thesis, I distinguish between different categories of fiction experiences, based on their interactivity and the way they involve their appreciator. For each of these categories, I specify in which way appreciators deal with the presented fictional world, how imagination is involved, and in what ways the appreciator’s emotions, desires, and actions are part of the fiction experience.
Original language | English |
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Qualification | Doctor of Philosophy |
Awarding Institution |
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Supervisors/Advisors |
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Award date | 30 Jun 2020 |
Place of Publication | Antwerp |
Publisher | |
Publication status | Published - 2020 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Videogames
- Fictional Experience
- Imagination
- Paradox of Fiction
- Paradox of Interactive Fiction