@techreport{e3bfe910863f46e8b9aaf29c97b7a05e,
title = "The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying",
abstract = "This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder.We compare t he behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs official s that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission.The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs.Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.",
keywords = "Game Theory, Lobbying",
author = "J.J.M. Potters and {van Winden}, F.A.A.M.",
note = "Pagination: 27",
year = "1996",
language = "English",
volume = "1996-06",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",
}