The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying

J.J.M. Potters, F.A.A.M. van Winden

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder.We compare t he behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs official s that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission.The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs.Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages27
Volume1996-06
Publication statusPublished - 1996

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1996-06

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Students
Costs
Experiments

Keywords

  • Game Theory
  • Lobbying

Cite this

Potters, J. J. M., & van Winden, F. A. A. M. (1996). The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1996-06). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Potters, J.J.M. ; van Winden, F.A.A.M. / The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Potters, JJM & van Winden, FAAM 1996 'The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1996-06, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying. / Potters, J.J.M.; van Winden, F.A.A.M.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1996-06).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying

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AU - van Winden, F.A.A.M.

N1 - Pagination: 27

PY - 1996

Y1 - 1996

N2 - This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder.We compare t he behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs official s that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission.The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs.Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.

AB - This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder.We compare t he behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs official s that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission.The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs.Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.

KW - Game Theory

KW - Lobbying

M3 - Discussion paper

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T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying

PB - Microeconomics

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Potters JJM, van Winden FAAM. The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper).