The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying

J.J.M. Potters, F.A.A.M. van Winden

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

294 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder.We compare t he behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs official s that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission.The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs.Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages27
Volume1996-06
Publication statusPublished - 1996

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1996-06

Keywords

  • Game Theory
  • Lobbying

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this