The Political Economy of Capital Income and Profit Taxation in a Small Open Economy

H.P. Huizinga, S.B. Nielsen

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper considers the political economy of the mix of profit, investment and saving taxation in a small open economy where agents generally differ in their shares of profit and other income.In this setting, capital income taxation can have the dual role of financing government spending and of redistributing income.With majority voting, several different constellations of profit, investment and saving taxes can arise.The paper, for instance, can explain why distorting saving taxation exists, even if profits are not taxed to the fullest extent.Alternatively, saving may be subsidized, even if profit and investment are highly taxed.The role of the foreign ownership of domestic firms in explaining capital income taxation is examined for the two cases of majority voting and a representative agent.With majority voting, a higher foreign ownership may induce a shift towards higher profit
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages21
Volume1996-106
Publication statusPublished - 1996

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1996-106

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Income
Taxation
Small open economy
Profit
Political economy
Majority voting
Capital income taxation
Foreign ownership
Financing
Tax
Representative agent
Domestic firms
Government spending

Keywords

  • taxation
  • political economy
  • open economy

Cite this

Huizinga, H. P., & Nielsen, S. B. (1996). The Political Economy of Capital Income and Profit Taxation in a Small Open Economy. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1996-106). Tilburg: Macroeconomics.
Huizinga, H.P. ; Nielsen, S.B. / The Political Economy of Capital Income and Profit Taxation in a Small Open Economy. Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Huizinga, HP & Nielsen, SB 1996 'The Political Economy of Capital Income and Profit Taxation in a Small Open Economy' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1996-106, Macroeconomics, Tilburg.

The Political Economy of Capital Income and Profit Taxation in a Small Open Economy. / Huizinga, H.P.; Nielsen, S.B.

Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1996-106).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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N2 - This paper considers the political economy of the mix of profit, investment and saving taxation in a small open economy where agents generally differ in their shares of profit and other income.In this setting, capital income taxation can have the dual role of financing government spending and of redistributing income.With majority voting, several different constellations of profit, investment and saving taxes can arise.The paper, for instance, can explain why distorting saving taxation exists, even if profits are not taxed to the fullest extent.Alternatively, saving may be subsidized, even if profit and investment are highly taxed.The role of the foreign ownership of domestic firms in explaining capital income taxation is examined for the two cases of majority voting and a representative agent.With majority voting, a higher foreign ownership may induce a shift towards higher profit

AB - This paper considers the political economy of the mix of profit, investment and saving taxation in a small open economy where agents generally differ in their shares of profit and other income.In this setting, capital income taxation can have the dual role of financing government spending and of redistributing income.With majority voting, several different constellations of profit, investment and saving taxes can arise.The paper, for instance, can explain why distorting saving taxation exists, even if profits are not taxed to the fullest extent.Alternatively, saving may be subsidized, even if profit and investment are highly taxed.The role of the foreign ownership of domestic firms in explaining capital income taxation is examined for the two cases of majority voting and a representative agent.With majority voting, a higher foreign ownership may induce a shift towards higher profit

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Huizinga HP, Nielsen SB. The Political Economy of Capital Income and Profit Taxation in a Small Open Economy. Tilburg: Macroeconomics. 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper).