The Political Economy of Intergenerational Risk Sharing

D.A. Hollanders

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper analyses the political constraints of intergenerational risk sharing. The rst result is that the political process generally does not lead to ex ante optimal insurance. The second result is that in a second best political setting PAYG still contributes to intergenerational risk sharing. The third result is that aging in- creases the discrepancy between rst-best and second-best transfers. The source of the ine¢ ciency is that politicians redistribute to larger and easier swayed cohorts. Ex post redistribution to lower incomes still leads to an outcome that from an ex ante point of view is preferable to a situation without intergenerational transfers.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages25
Volume2010-102
Publication statusPublished - 2010

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2010-102

Fingerprint

Intergenerational risk sharing
Political economy
Pay-as-you-go tax
Politicians
Political process
Low income
Optimal insurance
Discrepancy
Intergenerational transfers
Cohort
Redistribution
Political constraints

Keywords

  • risk sharing
  • aging
  • political economy

Cite this

Hollanders, D. A. (2010). The Political Economy of Intergenerational Risk Sharing. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2010-102). Tilburg: Macroeconomics.
Hollanders, D.A. / The Political Economy of Intergenerational Risk Sharing. Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2010. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Hollanders, DA 2010 'The Political Economy of Intergenerational Risk Sharing' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2010-102, Macroeconomics, Tilburg.

The Political Economy of Intergenerational Risk Sharing. / Hollanders, D.A.

Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2010. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2010-102).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Hollanders DA. The Political Economy of Intergenerational Risk Sharing. Tilburg: Macroeconomics. 2010. (CentER Discussion Paper).