The possibility of impossible stairways

Tail events and countable player sets

M. Voorneveld

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In classical game theory, players have finitely many actions and evaluate outcomes of mixed strategies using a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function. Allowing a larger, but countable, player set introduces phenomena that are impossible in finite games: Even if players have identical payoffs (no conflicts of interest), (1) this payoff may be minimized in dominant-strategy equilibria, and (2) games so alike that even the consequences of unilateral deviations are the same, may have disjoint sets of payoff-dominant equilibria. Moreover, a class of games without (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria is constructed
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)403-410
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume68
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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Deviation
Nash equilibrium
Dominant strategy
Utility function
Conflict of interest
Game theory
Mixed strategy

Cite this

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The possibility of impossible stairways : Tail events and countable player sets. / Voorneveld, M.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2010, p. 403-410.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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