The Probabilistic Representative Values

S. Lorenzo-Freire, B. Casas-Mendez

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    Abstract

    In this paper we define a new family of solutions for the class of cooperative games with transferable utility, in which the set of players exhibits a structure of a priori unions.This family is deeply connected with the Shapley value for games with transferable utility but, moreover, we assume a solidarity strong connection among all the components of each union.As a consequence of this, they are disposed to delegate one coalition of members of the union to negotiate with the other unions, and, therefore, each union will have a representative coalition.Furthermore, three interesting solutions that belong to this family of values are studied, as well as the non cooperative selection of the best representative coalition for each union.
    Original languageEnglish
    Place of PublicationTilburg
    PublisherVakgroep CentER
    Number of pages20
    Volume2005-106
    Publication statusPublished - 2005

    Publication series

    NameCentER Discussion Paper
    Volume2005-106

    Keywords

    • TU-games with unions
    • Shapley value
    • representative coalition

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    Lorenzo-Freire, S., & Casas-Mendez, B. (2005). The Probabilistic Representative Values. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-106). Vakgroep CentER.