The problem of perception and the no-miracles principle

Stanford u*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


The problem of perception is the problem of explaining how perceptual knowledge is possible. The skeptic has a simple solution: it is not possible. I analyze the weaknesses of one type of skeptical reasoning by making explicit a dynamic (or diachronic) epistemic principle from dynamic epistemic logic that is implicitly used in debating the problem, with the aim of offering a novel diagnosis to this skeptical argument. I argue (i) that prominent modest foundationalist responses to perceptual skepticism can be understood as rejecting the dynamic assumption made by the skeptic, (ii) that there are independent reasons to doubt the truth of such a principle in the context of skeptical reasoning, and (iii) that making the dynamic principle explicit allows for a better understanding of at least one objection to modest foundationalism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)11065-11080
Number of pages16
Issue number11
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2021
Externally publishedYes


  • Disjunctivism
  • Dogmatism
  • Dynamic epistemic logic
  • Externalism
  • Introspection principles
  • Modest foundationalism
  • Perceptual skepticism


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