The Procedural Egalitarian Solution

Bas Dietzenbacher, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx

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In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - 5 Oct 2016

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper


  • egalitarianism
  • egalitarian procedure
  • procedural egalitatian solution
  • egalitarian stability
  • constrained equal awards rule

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