The Procedural Egalitarian Solution

Bas Dietzenbacher; Peter Borm; Ruud Hendrickx

The Procedural Egalitarian Solution

Bas Dietzenbacher, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx

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Abstract

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Tilburg
Publisher	CentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages	18
Volume	2016-041
Publication status	Published - 5 Oct 2016

Publication series

Name	CentER Discussion Paper
Volume	2016-041

Keywords

egalitarianism
egalitarian procedure
procedural egalitatian solution
egalitarian stability
constrained equal awards rule

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2016-041Submitted manuscript, 370 KB

1 Article

The procedural egalitarian solution
Dietzenbacher, B., Borm, P. & Hendrickx, R., Nov 2017, In: Games and Economic Behavior. 106, p. 179-187
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review
7 Citations (Scopus)

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KW - procedural egalitatian solution

KW - egalitarian stability

KW - constrained equal awards rule

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BT - The Procedural Egalitarian Solution

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The Procedural Egalitarian Solution

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The procedural egalitarian solution

Cite this