The Procedural Egalitarian Solution and Egalitarian Stable Games

Bas Dietzenbacher

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Abstract

This paper studies the procedural egalitarian solution on the class of egalitarian
stable games. By deriving several axiomatic characterizations involving consistency and monotonicity, we show that the procedural egalitarian solution satisfies various desirable properties and unites many egalitarian concepts defined in the literature. Moreover, we illustrate the computational implications of these characterizations and relate the class of egalitarian stable games to other well-known classes.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages26
Volume2019-007
Publication statusPublished - 5 Mar 2019

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2019-007

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Keywords

  • egalitarianism
  • transferable utility games
  • procedural egalitarian solution
  • egalitarian stability

Cite this

Dietzenbacher, B. (2019). The Procedural Egalitarian Solution and Egalitarian Stable Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2019-007). Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.