Abstract
This paper studies the procedural egalitarian solution on the class of egalitarian
stable games. By deriving several axiomatic characterizations involving consistency and monotonicity, we show that the procedural egalitarian solution satisfies various desirable properties and unites many egalitarian concepts defined in the literature. Moreover, we illustrate the computational implications of these characterizations and relate the class of egalitarian stable games to other well-known classes.
stable games. By deriving several axiomatic characterizations involving consistency and monotonicity, we show that the procedural egalitarian solution satisfies various desirable properties and unites many egalitarian concepts defined in the literature. Moreover, we illustrate the computational implications of these characterizations and relate the class of egalitarian stable games to other well-known classes.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | CentER, Center for Economic Research |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Volume | 2019-007 |
| Publication status | Published - 5 Mar 2019 |
Publication series
| Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2019-007 |
Keywords
- egalitarianism
- transferable utility games
- procedural egalitarian solution
- egalitarian stability