The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation

R. Repullo, J. Suarez

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

We assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the economy can impair their capacity to lend in the future and, as a precaution, hold capital buffers. We find that under cyclically-varying risk-based capital requirements (e.g. Basel II) banks hold larger buffers in expansions than in recessions. Yet, these buffers are insufficient to prevent a significant contraction in the supply of credit at the arrival of a recession. We show that cyclical adjustments in the confidence level underlying Basel II can reduce its procyclical effects on the supply of credit without compromising banks’ long-run solvency targets.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEBC
Number of pages51
Volume2010-05S
Publication statusPublished - 2010

Publication series

NameEBC Discussion Paper
Volume2010-05S

Fingerprint

Bank capital regulation
Buffer
Basel II
Recession
Credit
Risk-based capital
Contraction
Precaution
Capital requirements
Equity markets
Relationship lending
Confidence
Solvency
Dynamic equilibrium

Keywords

  • Banking regulation
  • Basel II
  • Business cycles
  • Capital requirements
  • Credit crunch
  • Loan defaults
  • Relationship banking

Cite this

Repullo, R., & Suarez, J. (2010). The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation. (EBC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2010-05S). Tilburg: EBC.
Repullo, R. ; Suarez, J. / The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation. Tilburg : EBC, 2010. (EBC Discussion Paper).
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Repullo, R & Suarez, J 2010 'The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation' EBC Discussion Paper, vol. 2010-05S, EBC, Tilburg.

The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation. / Repullo, R.; Suarez, J.

Tilburg : EBC, 2010. (EBC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2010-05S).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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N2 - We assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the economy can impair their capacity to lend in the future and, as a precaution, hold capital buffers. We find that under cyclically-varying risk-based capital requirements (e.g. Basel II) banks hold larger buffers in expansions than in recessions. Yet, these buffers are insufficient to prevent a significant contraction in the supply of credit at the arrival of a recession. We show that cyclical adjustments in the confidence level underlying Basel II can reduce its procyclical effects on the supply of credit without compromising banks’ long-run solvency targets.

AB - We assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the economy can impair their capacity to lend in the future and, as a precaution, hold capital buffers. We find that under cyclically-varying risk-based capital requirements (e.g. Basel II) banks hold larger buffers in expansions than in recessions. Yet, these buffers are insufficient to prevent a significant contraction in the supply of credit at the arrival of a recession. We show that cyclical adjustments in the confidence level underlying Basel II can reduce its procyclical effects on the supply of credit without compromising banks’ long-run solvency targets.

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Repullo R, Suarez J. The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation. Tilburg: EBC. 2010. (EBC Discussion Paper).