Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 167-188 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Journal of Corporate Finance |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2011 |
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The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance. / Renneboog, L.D.R.; Szilagyi, P.G.
In: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2011, p. 167-188.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance
AU - Renneboog, L.D.R.
AU - Szilagyi, P.G.
N1 - Appeared earlier as CentER Discussion Paper 2009-065 (rt) Pagination: 22
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - This paper examines the corporate governance role of shareholder-initiated proxy proposals. We find that target firms tend to underperform and have generally poor governance structures, with little indication of systematic agenda-seeking by the proposal sponsors. Governance quality also affects the voting outcomes and the announcement period stock price effects, with the latter strongest for first-time submissions and during stock market peaks. Proposal implementation is largely a function of voting success but is affected by managerial entrenchment and rent-seeking. The results imply that shareholder proposals are a useful device of external control, countering arguments that they should be restricted rather than facilitated under the SEC's current regulatory agenda.
AB - This paper examines the corporate governance role of shareholder-initiated proxy proposals. We find that target firms tend to underperform and have generally poor governance structures, with little indication of systematic agenda-seeking by the proposal sponsors. Governance quality also affects the voting outcomes and the announcement period stock price effects, with the latter strongest for first-time submissions and during stock market peaks. Proposal implementation is largely a function of voting success but is affected by managerial entrenchment and rent-seeking. The results imply that shareholder proposals are a useful device of external control, countering arguments that they should be restricted rather than facilitated under the SEC's current regulatory agenda.
U2 - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.10.002
DO - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.10.002
M3 - Article
VL - 17
SP - 167
EP - 188
JO - Journal of Corporate Finance
JF - Journal of Corporate Finance
SN - 0929-1199
IS - 1
ER -