The Shapley Value for Directed Graph Games

A. Khmelnitskaya, O. Selçuk, A.J.J. Talman

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

The Shapley value for directed graph (digraph) games, TU games with limited cooperation introduced by an arbitrary digraph prescribing the dominance relation among the players, is introduced. It is defined as the average of marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations that do not violate the subordination of players. We assume that in order to cooperate players may join only coalitions containing no players dominating them. Properties of this solution are studied and a convexity type condition is provided that guarantees its stability with respect to an appropriately defined core concept. An axiomatization for cycle digraph games for which the digraphs are directed
cycles is obtained.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Pages1-10
Number of pages10
Volume2014-064
Publication statusPublished - 22 Oct 2014

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2014-064

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Directed graphs

Keywords

  • TU game
  • Shapley value
  • directed graph
  • dominance structure
  • core
  • convexity

Cite this

Khmelnitskaya, A., Selçuk, O., & Talman, A. J. J. (2014). The Shapley Value for Directed Graph Games. (pp. 1-10). (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2014-064). Tilburg: Operations research.
Khmelnitskaya, A. ; Selçuk, O. ; Talman, A.J.J. / The Shapley Value for Directed Graph Games. Tilburg : Operations research, 2014. pp. 1-10 (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Khmelnitskaya, A, Selçuk, O & Talman, AJJ 2014 'The Shapley Value for Directed Graph Games' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2014-064, Operations research, Tilburg, pp. 1-10.

The Shapley Value for Directed Graph Games. / Khmelnitskaya, A.; Selçuk, O.; Talman, A.J.J.

Tilburg : Operations research, 2014. p. 1-10 (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2014-064).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Khmelnitskaya A, Selçuk O, Talman AJJ. The Shapley Value for Directed Graph Games. Tilburg: Operations research. 2014 Oct 22, p. 1-10. (CentER Discussion Paper).