### Abstract

cycles is obtained.

Original language | English |
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Place of Publication | Tilburg |

Publisher | Operations research |

Pages | 1-10 |

Number of pages | 10 |

Volume | 2014-064 |

Publication status | Published - 22 Oct 2014 |

### Publication series

Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
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Volume | 2014-064 |

### Fingerprint

### Keywords

- TU game
- Shapley value
- directed graph
- dominance structure
- core
- convexity

### Cite this

*The Shapley Value for Directed Graph Games*. (pp. 1-10). (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2014-064). Tilburg: Operations research.

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**The Shapley Value for Directed Graph Games.** / Khmelnitskaya, A.; Selçuk, O.; Talman, A.J.J.

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - The Shapley Value for Directed Graph Games

AU - Khmelnitskaya, A.

AU - Selçuk, O.

AU - Talman, A.J.J.

PY - 2014/10/22

Y1 - 2014/10/22

N2 - The Shapley value for directed graph (digraph) games, TU games with limited cooperation introduced by an arbitrary digraph prescribing the dominance relation among the players, is introduced. It is defined as the average of marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations that do not violate the subordination of players. We assume that in order to cooperate players may join only coalitions containing no players dominating them. Properties of this solution are studied and a convexity type condition is provided that guarantees its stability with respect to an appropriately defined core concept. An axiomatization for cycle digraph games for which the digraphs are directedcycles is obtained.

AB - The Shapley value for directed graph (digraph) games, TU games with limited cooperation introduced by an arbitrary digraph prescribing the dominance relation among the players, is introduced. It is defined as the average of marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations that do not violate the subordination of players. We assume that in order to cooperate players may join only coalitions containing no players dominating them. Properties of this solution are studied and a convexity type condition is provided that guarantees its stability with respect to an appropriately defined core concept. An axiomatization for cycle digraph games for which the digraphs are directedcycles is obtained.

KW - TU game

KW - Shapley value

KW - directed graph

KW - dominance structure

KW - core

KW - convexity

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2014-064

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

SP - 1

EP - 10

BT - The Shapley Value for Directed Graph Games

PB - Operations research

CY - Tilburg

ER -