The Structure of the Set of Equilibria for Two Person Multicriteria Games

P.E.M. Borm, D. Vermeulen, M. Voorneveld

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Abstract

In this paper the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games is analysed. It turns out that the classical result for the set of equilibria for bimatrix games, that it is a finite union of polytopes, is only valid for multicriteria games if one of the players only has two pure strategies. A full polyhedral description of these polytopes can be derived when the player with an arbitrary number of pure strategies has one criterion.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages20
Volume1998-75
Publication statusPublished - 1998

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1998-75

Keywords

  • game theory
  • equilibrium theory

Cite this

Borm, P. E. M., Vermeulen, D., & Voorneveld, M. (1998). The Structure of the Set of Equilibria for Two Person Multicriteria Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1998-75). Microeconomics.