The Supererogatory and How Not To Accommodate It: A Reply to Dorsey

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

It is plausible to think that there exist acts of supererogation (acts that are morally optional and morally better than the minimum that morality demands). It also seems plausible that there is a close connection between what we are morally required to do and what it would be morally good to do. Despite being independently plausible these two claims are hard to reconcile. My aim in this paper will be to respond to a recent solution to this puzzle proposed by Dale Dorsey (2013). Dorsey’s solution to this problem is to posit a new account of supererogation. I will argue that Dorsey’s account fails to succeed in achieving what an account of supererogation is supposed to achieve.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)179-188
Number of pages9
JournalUtilitas
Volume28
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2016

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morality
Supererogation
Morality

Keywords

  • supererogation
  • moral obligation
  • consequentialism
  • moral reasons

Cite this

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The Supererogatory and How Not To Accommodate It : A Reply to Dorsey. / Archer, Alfred.

In: Utilitas, Vol. 28, No. 2, 01.06.2016, p. 179-188.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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