Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine how firm growth, and its decomposition into acquisitive and organic growth, can serve as an antecedent to the disparity in pay between the CEO and other top management team (TMT) members.
Design/methodology/approach
Drawing on tournament theory, the authors argue that acquisitive and organic growth strategies have different effects on CEO-TMT pay disparity.
Findings
The authors find that acquisitive growth, measured through the number and size of acquisitions, increases CEO-TMT pay disparity while organic growth has no effect on CEO-TMT pay disparity.
Practical implications
The findings, based in the context of the Netherlands, imply that boards in their monitoring activity may need to take into account the potential incentive effects of acquisitive activity as CEOs may have a greater motivation to engage in acquisitions than their fellow TMT members.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to the literature on relative compensation and incentives and the literature on managerial compensation and firm strategy. To investigate the role of firm growth in increasing CEO-TMT pay disparity, the authors adopt a fine-grained approach along two dimensions. First, the authors disaggregate firm growth into organic and acquisition driven firm growth. Second, the authors disaggregate pay disparity in these components.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how firm growth, and its decomposition into acquisitive and organic growth, can serve as an antecedent to the disparity in pay between the CEO and other top management team (TMT) members.
Design/methodology/approach
Drawing on tournament theory, the authors argue that acquisitive and organic growth strategies have different effects on CEO-TMT pay disparity.
Findings
The authors find that acquisitive growth, measured through the number and size of acquisitions, increases CEO-TMT pay disparity while organic growth has no effect on CEO-TMT pay disparity.
Practical implications
The findings, based in the context of the Netherlands, imply that boards in their monitoring activity may need to take into account the potential incentive effects of acquisitive activity as CEOs may have a greater motivation to engage in acquisitions than their fellow TMT members.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to the literature on relative compensation and incentives and the literature on managerial compensation and firm strategy. To investigate the role of firm growth in increasing CEO-TMT pay disparity, the authors adopt a fine-grained approach along two dimensions. First, the authors disaggregate firm growth into organic and acquisition driven firm growth. Second, the authors disaggregate pay disparity in these components.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 2038-2059 |
Journal | Management Decision |
Volume | 56 |
Issue number | 9 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Keywords
- organic growth
- acquisitions
- executive compensation
- CEO-TMT pay disparity