The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness

S.C.W. Eijffinger, M.M. Hoeberichts

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper introduces a parameter for central bank independence in a monetary policy game with a conservative central banker.It tries to explain the optimal degree of central bank independence and conservativeness by four economic and political determinants, both theoretically and empirically.There appears to be a trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness.Then, by comparing the optimal degree of conservativeness and independence with the actual degree of independence, we want to identify the optimal degree of conservativeness for the countries participating in EMU.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages27
Volume1996-44
Publication statusPublished - 1996

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1996-44

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Trade-offs
Central bank independence
Economics
Bankers
Policy games
Monetary policy

Keywords

  • central banks
  • independence
  • conservativeness

Cite this

Eijffinger, S. C. W., & Hoeberichts, M. M. (1996). The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1996-44). Tilburg: Macroeconomics.
Eijffinger, S.C.W. ; Hoeberichts, M.M. / The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness. Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Eijffinger, SCW & Hoeberichts, MM 1996 'The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1996-44, Macroeconomics, Tilburg.

The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness. / Eijffinger, S.C.W.; Hoeberichts, M.M.

Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1996-44).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Eijffinger SCW, Hoeberichts MM. The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness. Tilburg: Macroeconomics. 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper).