@techreport{e07294afb17a4149bb4417842d0b5cb3,
title = "The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences",
abstract = "We analyse gender differences in the trust game in a {"}behind the veil of ignorance{"} design.This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments.We observe that, on averge, men and women do not differ in {"}trust{"}, and that women are slightly more {"}trustworthy{"}.However, men's strategies are bimodal, peaking at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the Pareto efficient frontier, while women's strategies are single peaked at moderate tranfers.Moreover, if a man [woman] exhibits low trust, he [she] is likely to be a money-maximizer [a risk or betrayal averse reciprocator].",
keywords = "gender differences, trust game, experiment, strategy method behind the veil of ignorance",
author = "J. Vyrastekova and A.M. Onderstal",
note = "Pagination: 15",
year = "2005",
language = "English",
volume = "2005-96",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",
}