The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences

J. Vyrastekova, A.M. Onderstal

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Abstract

We analyse gender differences in the trust game in a "behind the veil of ignorance" design.This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments.We observe that, on averge, men and women do not differ in "trust", and that women are slightly more "trustworthy".However, men's strategies are bimodal, peaking at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the Pareto efficient frontier, while women's strategies are single peaked at moderate tranfers.Moreover, if a man [woman] exhibits low trust, he [she] is likely to be a money-maximizer [a risk or betrayal averse reciprocator].
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages15
Volume2005-96
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2005-96

Keywords

  • gender differences
  • trust game
  • experiment
  • strategy method behind the veil of ignorance

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