The VL control measure for symmetric networks

R.L.P. Hendrickx, P.E.M. Borm, J.R. van den Brink, G. Owen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper we measure “control” of nodes in a network by solving an associated optimisation problem. We motivate this so-called VL control measure by giving an interpretation in terms of allocating resources optimally to the nodes in order to maximise some search probability. We determine the VL control measure for various classes of networks. Furthermore, we provide two game theoretic interpretations of this measure. First it turns out that the VL control measure is a particular proper Shapley value of the associated cooperative network game. Secondly, we relate the measure to optimal strategies in an associated matrix search game.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)85-91
JournalSocial Networks
Volume31
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2009

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Hendrickx, R.L.P. ; Borm, P.E.M. ; van den Brink, J.R. ; Owen, G. / The VL control measure for symmetric networks. In: Social Networks. 2009 ; Vol. 31, No. 1. pp. 85-91.
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author = "R.L.P. Hendrickx and P.E.M. Borm and {van den Brink}, J.R. and G. Owen",
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Hendrickx, RLP, Borm, PEM, van den Brink, JR & Owen, G 2009, 'The VL control measure for symmetric networks', Social Networks, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 85-91.

The VL control measure for symmetric networks. / Hendrickx, R.L.P.; Borm, P.E.M.; van den Brink, J.R.; Owen, G.

In: Social Networks, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2009, p. 85-91.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - The VL control measure for symmetric networks

AU - Hendrickx, R.L.P.

AU - Borm, P.E.M.

AU - van den Brink, J.R.

AU - Owen, G.

N1 - Appeared earlier as CentER Discussion Paper 2005-65 (revised title)

PY - 2009

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N2 - In this paper we measure “control” of nodes in a network by solving an associated optimisation problem. We motivate this so-called VL control measure by giving an interpretation in terms of allocating resources optimally to the nodes in order to maximise some search probability. We determine the VL control measure for various classes of networks. Furthermore, we provide two game theoretic interpretations of this measure. First it turns out that the VL control measure is a particular proper Shapley value of the associated cooperative network game. Secondly, we relate the measure to optimal strategies in an associated matrix search game.

AB - In this paper we measure “control” of nodes in a network by solving an associated optimisation problem. We motivate this so-called VL control measure by giving an interpretation in terms of allocating resources optimally to the nodes in order to maximise some search probability. We determine the VL control measure for various classes of networks. Furthermore, we provide two game theoretic interpretations of this measure. First it turns out that the VL control measure is a particular proper Shapley value of the associated cooperative network game. Secondly, we relate the measure to optimal strategies in an associated matrix search game.

M3 - Article

VL - 31

SP - 85

EP - 91

JO - Social Networks

JF - Social Networks

SN - 0378-8733

IS - 1

ER -