The weak sequential core for two-period economies

P.J.J. Herings*, A Predtetchinski, A Perea

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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Abstract

We adapt the classical core concept to deal with situations involving time and uncertainty. We define the weak sequential core as the set of allocations that are stable against coalitional deviations ex ante, and moreover cannot be improved upon by any coalition after the resolution of uncertainty. We restrict ourselves to credible deviations, where a coalitional deviation cannot be counterblocked by some subcoalition. We study the relationship of the resulting core concept with other sequential core concepts, give sufficient conditions under which the weak sequential core is non-empty, but show that it is possible to give reasonable examples where it is empty.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)55-65
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume34
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2006
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • core
  • assets

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