The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective

M. Butler, H. Hauser

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

We explore the incentives countries face in trade litigation within the new WTO Dispute Settlement System. Our analysis yields a number of interesting predictions. First, because sanctions are ruled out during the litigation process, the Dispute Settlement System does not preclude all new trade restrictions. However, the agendasetting capacity of the complainant, including its right to force a decision, make trade restrictions less attractive than under the WTO's predecessor GATT. Second, the system's appellate review provides the losing defendant with strong incentives to delay negative findings, and both parties with a possibility to signal their determinacy in fighting the case. Third, a relatively weak implementation procedure potentially reinforces incentives to violate WTO trade rules. Fourth, bilateral settlements are more likely at an early stage in the process and are biased towards the expected outcome of the formal dispute settlement procedure. Empirical evidence based on a first data set of cases at an advanced stage of the litigation process provides qualitative support for our claims.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages35
Volume2000-21
Publication statusPublished - 2000

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2000-21

Fingerprint

WTO
incentive
economics
GATT
sanction
evidence

Keywords

  • World trade organization
  • dispute settlement
  • trade restrictions

Cite this

Butler, M., & Hauser, H. (2000). The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-21). Tilburg: Macroeconomics.
Butler, M. ; Hauser, H. / The WTO Dispute Settlement System : A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective. Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Butler, M & Hauser, H 2000 'The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2000-21, Macroeconomics, Tilburg.

The WTO Dispute Settlement System : A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective. / Butler, M.; Hauser, H.

Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-21).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Butler M, Hauser H. The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective. Tilburg: Macroeconomics. 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper).