Time to Complete and Research Joint Ventures: A Differential Game Approach

J. Navas, P.M. Kort

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze cooperation in R&D in the form of RJVs.We show that the optimal size of an RJV does not only depend on the degree of spillovers, as literature suggests, but also on the cost function of R&D activities.Moreover, the explicit consideration of the fact that R&D projects take time to complete shows that benefits from cooperation in R&D not only allow RJVs to carry out larger R&D projects, but also to reduce the time to completion for projects with a given size and, consequently, to accelerate the acquisition of the benefits associated with the innovation.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages34
Volume2005-29
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2005-29

Keywords

  • Differential games
  • Research Joint Ventures
  • Time to complete

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