Abstract
It is commonly accepted that tolerance is a virtue, a desirable character trait that should be fostered and cultivated, especially in liberal societies. In this chapter, we consider the plausibility of an alternative view, namely that tolerance is not necessarily a virtue. This view adopts a broad and normatively neutral definition of tolerance as simply meaning: deliberately refraining from intervening with conduct one finds objectionable. Moreover, if tolerance is to play an important role in the kind of liberal and pluralist democracies we are currently living in, then such a broad and neutral conception is much more suitable than a more narrow and normatively laden one. Tolerance can and should be something enforceable through law, which becomes difficult, if not impossible, when one understands it as a virtue.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration |
Editors | Mitja Sardoč |
Place of Publication | Cham |
Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
Pages | 1-17 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9783030032272 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2021 |