Trade policy in markets with collusion

The case of North-South R&D spillovers

J. Boone, K. Žigić

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

It is well known that unilateral R&D spillovers hamper domestic firms׳ incentives to invest in innovations and thus have likely adverse effects for domestic welfare. However, when tacit collusion between foreign and domestic firms is likely, R&D spillovers may encourage monopoly pricing and therefore may have an additional detrimental impact on domestic welfare, especially on consumer surplus. Tariff protection could address this problem by altering firms׳ cost efficiency distribution and, thus, by inducing tougher market competition. Consumers benefit from the tariff policy, and governments that assign a high enough weight to the consumer surplus set positive tariff levels. Under protection domestic firms׳ innovation level remains the same as under free trade but the average industry efficiency increases.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)224-237
JournalResearch in Economics
Volume69
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2015

Fingerprint

Tariffs
Trade policy
Spillover
Domestic firms
Collusion
Innovation
Consumer surplus
Industry
Monopoly pricing
Free trade
Incentives
Government
Market competition
Tacit collusion
Foreign firms

Keywords

  • R&D spillovers
  • Tariff protection
  • supergames
  • cost asymmetries
  • leadership
  • tacit collusion

Cite this

Boone, J. ; Žigić , K. / Trade policy in markets with collusion : The case of North-South R&D spillovers. In: Research in Economics. 2015 ; Vol. 69, No. 2. pp. 224-237.
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Boone, J & Žigić , K 2015, 'Trade policy in markets with collusion: The case of North-South R&D spillovers', Research in Economics, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 224-237. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2015.02.006

Trade policy in markets with collusion : The case of North-South R&D spillovers. / Boone, J.; Žigić , K.

In: Research in Economics, Vol. 69, No. 2, 06.2015, p. 224-237.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

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Boone J, Žigić K. Trade policy in markets with collusion: The case of North-South R&D spillovers. Research in Economics. 2015 Jun;69(2):224-237. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2015.02.006

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