@techreport{22773d9ccb374646bed9f3f3e5061ffc,
title = "Tradeable Emission Permits in Oligopoly",
abstract = "The paper considers an oligopolistic industry in which pollution is a by-product of production. Firms are assumed to have emission permits that restrict the amount that they pollute. These permits are assumed to be tradeable and the paper discusses a structure in which the same set of firms operates both in the product market as well as in the pollution permits market. The paper demonstrates that in such a structure allowing trade in emission permits is not necessarily beneficial. In particular it may lead to the choice of inferior production and abatement technologies, it may lead to a market equilibrium with lower output rates and higher prices and it may result in a shift of production from a low cost to a high cost firm.",
keywords = "pollution control, oligopoly, trade, emission permit",
author = "C. Fershtman and {de Zeeuw}, A.J.",
note = "Pagination: 30",
year = "1996",
language = "English",
volume = "1996-30",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",
}