Transboundary Fishery Management: A Game Theoretic Approach

K.H. Pham Do, H. Folmer, H.W. Norde

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Abstract

A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we address the problem of allocating the profits between the charter members and the entrants, once the nations concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement.Using game theory we argue that in the case of independent countries adjustment from the Nash equilibrium can be achieved by means of the proportional rule.Furthermore, we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for division of profits within a coalition. Finally, we show that the equal division of the net gain value can be used to expand a coalition.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages19
Volume2001-17
Publication statusPublished - 2001

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2001-17

Keywords

  • game theory
  • fishing industry
  • Nash equilibrium

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    Pham Do, K. H., Folmer, H., & Norde, H. W. (2001). Transboundary Fishery Management: A Game Theoretic Approach. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2001-17). Microeconomics.