Abstract
We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 2126-2139 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 146 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2011 |
Keywords
- Transferable utility games
- Uncertainty
- Weak Sequential Core
- COOPERATIVE GAMES
- SEQUENTIAL CORE