Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems

E.A. Lazarova, P.E.M. Borm, A. Estevez

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output


In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractually exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensation exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationAmsterdam
PublisherTinbergen Institute
VolumeTI 2014-086/II
Publication statusPublished - 8 Jul 2014

Publication series

NameTinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
PublisherTInbergen Institute
VolumeTI 2014-086/II


  • matching
  • Pareto optimal matching
  • contractually exchange stability
  • compensation stability
  • compensation schedule


Dive into the research topics of 'Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this