Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems

E.A. Lazarova, P.E.M. Borm, A. Estevez

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractually exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensation exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationAmsterdam
PublisherTinbergen Institute
Pages16
VolumeTI 2014-086/II
Publication statusPublished - 8 Jul 2014

Publication series

NameTinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
PublisherTInbergen Institute
VolumeTI 2014-086/II

Fingerprint

Two-sided matching
Matching problem
Reward
Deviation
Optimal matching
Schedule

Keywords

  • matching
  • Pareto optimal matching
  • contractually exchange stability
  • compensation stability
  • compensation schedule

Cite this

Lazarova, E. A., Borm, P. E. M., & Estevez, A. (2014). Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems. (pp. 16). (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; Vol. TI 2014-086/II). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
Lazarova, E.A. ; Borm, P.E.M. ; Estevez, A. / Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems. Amsterdam : Tinbergen Institute, 2014. pp. 16 (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper).
@techreport{e7b312c57c404137b0963592df615423,
title = "Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems",
abstract = "In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractually exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensation exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty.",
keywords = "matching, Pareto optimal matching, contractually exchange stability, compensation stability, compensation schedule",
author = "E.A. Lazarova and P.E.M. Borm and A. Estevez",
year = "2014",
month = "7",
day = "8",
language = "English",
volume = "TI 2014-086/II",
series = "Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Tinbergen Institute",
pages = "16",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Tinbergen Institute",

}

Lazarova, EA, Borm, PEM & Estevez, A 2014 'Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems' Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, vol. TI 2014-086/II, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, pp. 16.

Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems. / Lazarova, E.A.; Borm, P.E.M.; Estevez, A.

Amsterdam : Tinbergen Institute, 2014. p. 16 (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; Vol. TI 2014-086/II).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems

AU - Lazarova, E.A.

AU - Borm, P.E.M.

AU - Estevez, A.

PY - 2014/7/8

Y1 - 2014/7/8

N2 - In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractually exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensation exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty.

AB - In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractually exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensation exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty.

KW - matching

KW - Pareto optimal matching

KW - contractually exchange stability

KW - compensation stability

KW - compensation schedule

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - TI 2014-086/II

T3 - Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper

SP - 16

BT - Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems

PB - Tinbergen Institute

CY - Amsterdam

ER -

Lazarova EA, Borm PEM, Estevez A. Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems. Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. 2014 Jul 8, p. 16. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper).