Transparency and cooperation in repeated dilemma games

A meta study

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Abstract

We use data from experiments on finitely repeated dilemma games with fixed matching to investigate the effect of different types of information on cooperation. The data come from 71 studies using the voluntary contributions paradigm, covering 122 data points, and from 18 studies on decision-making in oligopoly, covering another 50 data points. We find similar effects in the two sets of experimental games. We find that transparency about what everyone in a group earns reduces contributions to the public good, as well as the degree of collusion in oligopoly markets. In contrast, transparency about choices tends to lead to an increase in contributions and collusion, although the size of this effect varies somewhat between the two settings. Our results are potentially useful for policy making, because they provide guidance on the type of information to target in order to stimulate or limit cooperation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)755-771
JournalExperimental Economics
Volume20
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2017

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Meta-study
Transparency
Collusion
Oligopoly
Guidance
Voluntary contributions
Policy making
Experimental games
Experiment
Paradigm
Decision making

Keywords

  • information
  • cooperation
  • repeated game
  • metastudy
  • laboratory experiment

Cite this

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title = "Transparency and cooperation in repeated dilemma games: A meta study",
abstract = "We use data from experiments on finitely repeated dilemma games with fixed matching to investigate the effect of different types of information on cooperation. The data come from 71 studies using the voluntary contributions paradigm, covering 122 data points, and from 18 studies on decision-making in oligopoly, covering another 50 data points. We find similar effects in the two sets of experimental games. We find that transparency about what everyone in a group earns reduces contributions to the public good, as well as the degree of collusion in oligopoly markets. In contrast, transparency about choices tends to lead to an increase in contributions and collusion, although the size of this effect varies somewhat between the two settings. Our results are potentially useful for policy making, because they provide guidance on the type of information to target in order to stimulate or limit cooperation.",
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Transparency and cooperation in repeated dilemma games : A meta study. / Fiala, Lenka; Suetens, Sigrid.

In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 20, No. 4, 12.2017, p. 755-771.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AB - We use data from experiments on finitely repeated dilemma games with fixed matching to investigate the effect of different types of information on cooperation. The data come from 71 studies using the voluntary contributions paradigm, covering 122 data points, and from 18 studies on decision-making in oligopoly, covering another 50 data points. We find similar effects in the two sets of experimental games. We find that transparency about what everyone in a group earns reduces contributions to the public good, as well as the degree of collusion in oligopoly markets. In contrast, transparency about choices tends to lead to an increase in contributions and collusion, although the size of this effect varies somewhat between the two settings. Our results are potentially useful for policy making, because they provide guidance on the type of information to target in order to stimulate or limit cooperation.

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