TY - JOUR
T1 - Transparency regulation in broadband markets
T2 - Lessons from experimental research
AU - Sluijs, J.P.J.B.
AU - Henze, B.
AU - Schuett, F.
N1 - Pagination: 10
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - This article presents a research project in experimental law and economics about transparency regulation in markets for experience goods, with implications for the implementation of transparency requirements in broadband markets. European and American regulators have introduced transparency policies in the broadband sector, although their effects on market actors are not fully understood. The experiment evaluates the effects of increased transparency on various market outcomes. Four scenarios are compared in which end-users have different amounts of information about quality. Findings of this research suggest that (1) more information about quality leads to higher total surplus and higher consumer surplus; (2) quality provided by firms increases with the level of transparency; and (3) quality and efficiency are marginally higher when full information about quality is only available to some consumers, than when all consumers have imperfect information about quality. To these findings a number of conclusions are attached relevant for broadband policy.
AB - This article presents a research project in experimental law and economics about transparency regulation in markets for experience goods, with implications for the implementation of transparency requirements in broadband markets. European and American regulators have introduced transparency policies in the broadband sector, although their effects on market actors are not fully understood. The experiment evaluates the effects of increased transparency on various market outcomes. Four scenarios are compared in which end-users have different amounts of information about quality. Findings of this research suggest that (1) more information about quality leads to higher total surplus and higher consumer surplus; (2) quality provided by firms increases with the level of transparency; and (3) quality and efficiency are marginally higher when full information about quality is only available to some consumers, than when all consumers have imperfect information about quality. To these findings a number of conclusions are attached relevant for broadband policy.
U2 - 10.1016/j.telpol.2011.05.003
DO - 10.1016/j.telpol.2011.05.003
M3 - Article
SN - 0308-5961
VL - 35
SP - 592
EP - 602
JO - Telecommunications Policy
JF - Telecommunications Policy
IS - 7
ER -