Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations

Larissa Batrancea*, Anca Nichita, Jerome Olsen, Christoph Kogler, Erich Kirchler, Erik Hoelzl, Avi Weiss, Benno Torgler, Jonas Fooken, Joanne Fuller, Markus Schaffner, Sheheryar Banuri, Medhat Hassanein, Gloria Alarcón-García, Ceyhan Aldemir, Oana Apostol, Diana Bank Weinberg, Ioan Batrancea, Alexis Belianin, Felipe de Jesús Bello Gómez & 39 others Marie Briguglio, Valerij Dermol, Elaine Doyle, Rebone Gcabo, Binglin Gong, Sara Ennya, Anthony Essel-Anderson, Jane Frecknall-Hughes, Ali Hasanain, Yoichi Hizen, Odilo Huber, Georgia Kaplanoglou, Janusz Kudła, Jérémy E. Lemoine, Supanika Leurcharusmee, Thorolfur Matthiasson, Sanjeev Mehta, Sejin Min, George Naufal, Mervi Niskanen, Katarina Nordblom, Engin Bağış Öztürk, Luis Pacheco, József Pántya, Vassilis Rapanos, Christine Roland-Lévy, Ana Maria Roux-Cesar, Aidin Salamzadeh, Lucia Savadori, Vidar Schei, Manoj Sharma, Barbara Summers, Komsan Suriya, Quoc Tran, Clara Villegas-Palacio, Martine Visser, Chun Xia, Sunghwan Yi, Sarunas Zukauskas

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Economic Psychology
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2019

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Batrancea, L., Nichita, A., Olsen, J., Kogler, C., Kirchler, E., Hoelzl, E., ... Zukauskas, S. (Accepted/In press). Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations. Journal of Economic Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.102191
Batrancea, Larissa ; Nichita, Anca ; Olsen, Jerome ; Kogler, Christoph ; Kirchler, Erich ; Hoelzl, Erik ; Weiss, Avi ; Torgler, Benno ; Fooken, Jonas ; Fuller, Joanne ; Schaffner, Markus ; Banuri, Sheheryar ; Hassanein, Medhat ; Alarcón-García, Gloria ; Aldemir, Ceyhan ; Apostol, Oana ; Weinberg, Diana Bank ; Batrancea, Ioan ; Belianin, Alexis ; Gómez, Felipe de Jesús Bello ; Briguglio, Marie ; Dermol, Valerij ; Doyle, Elaine ; Gcabo, Rebone ; Gong, Binglin ; Ennya, Sara ; Essel-Anderson, Anthony ; Frecknall-Hughes, Jane ; Hasanain, Ali ; Hizen, Yoichi ; Huber, Odilo ; Kaplanoglou, Georgia ; Kudła, Janusz ; Lemoine, Jérémy E. ; Leurcharusmee, Supanika ; Matthiasson, Thorolfur ; Mehta, Sanjeev ; Min, Sejin ; Naufal, George ; Niskanen, Mervi ; Nordblom, Katarina ; Öztürk, Engin Bağış ; Pacheco, Luis ; Pántya, József ; Rapanos, Vassilis ; Roland-Lévy, Christine ; Roux-Cesar, Ana Maria ; Salamzadeh, Aidin ; Savadori, Lucia ; Schei, Vidar ; Sharma, Manoj ; Summers, Barbara ; Suriya, Komsan ; Tran, Quoc ; Villegas-Palacio, Clara ; Visser, Martine ; Xia, Chun ; Yi, Sunghwan ; Zukauskas, Sarunas. / Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations. In: Journal of Economic Psychology. 2019.
@article{779b8db02a264d409ded47952aad61ca,
title = "Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations",
abstract = "The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.",
author = "Larissa Batrancea and Anca Nichita and Jerome Olsen and Christoph Kogler and Erich Kirchler and Erik Hoelzl and Avi Weiss and Benno Torgler and Jonas Fooken and Joanne Fuller and Markus Schaffner and Sheheryar Banuri and Medhat Hassanein and Gloria Alarc{\'o}n-Garc{\'i}a and Ceyhan Aldemir and Oana Apostol and Weinberg, {Diana Bank} and Ioan Batrancea and Alexis Belianin and G{\'o}mez, {Felipe de Jes{\'u}s Bello} and Marie Briguglio and Valerij Dermol and Elaine Doyle and Rebone Gcabo and Binglin Gong and Sara Ennya and Anthony Essel-Anderson and Jane Frecknall-Hughes and Ali Hasanain and Yoichi Hizen and Odilo Huber and Georgia Kaplanoglou and Janusz Kudła and Lemoine, {J{\'e}r{\'e}my E.} and Supanika Leurcharusmee and Thorolfur Matthiasson and Sanjeev Mehta and Sejin Min and George Naufal and Mervi Niskanen and Katarina Nordblom and {\"O}zt{\"u}rk, {Engin Bağış} and Luis Pacheco and J{\'o}zsef P{\'a}ntya and Vassilis Rapanos and Christine Roland-L{\'e}vy and Roux-Cesar, {Ana Maria} and Aidin Salamzadeh and Lucia Savadori and Vidar Schei and Manoj Sharma and Barbara Summers and Komsan Suriya and Quoc Tran and Clara Villegas-Palacio and Martine Visser and Chun Xia and Sunghwan Yi and Sarunas Zukauskas",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1016/j.joep.2019.102191",
language = "English",
journal = "Journal of Economic Psychology",
issn = "0167-4870",
publisher = "Elsevier Science BV",

}

Batrancea, L, Nichita, A, Olsen, J, Kogler, C, Kirchler, E, Hoelzl, E, Weiss, A, Torgler, B, Fooken, J, Fuller, J, Schaffner, M, Banuri, S, Hassanein, M, Alarcón-García, G, Aldemir, C, Apostol, O, Weinberg, DB, Batrancea, I, Belianin, A, Gómez, FDJB, Briguglio, M, Dermol, V, Doyle, E, Gcabo, R, Gong, B, Ennya, S, Essel-Anderson, A, Frecknall-Hughes, J, Hasanain, A, Hizen, Y, Huber, O, Kaplanoglou, G, Kudła, J, Lemoine, JE, Leurcharusmee, S, Matthiasson, T, Mehta, S, Min, S, Naufal, G, Niskanen, M, Nordblom, K, Öztürk, EB, Pacheco, L, Pántya, J, Rapanos, V, Roland-Lévy, C, Roux-Cesar, AM, Salamzadeh, A, Savadori, L, Schei, V, Sharma, M, Summers, B, Suriya, K, Tran, Q, Villegas-Palacio, C, Visser, M, Xia, C, Yi, S & Zukauskas, S 2019, 'Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations', Journal of Economic Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.102191

Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations. / Batrancea, Larissa; Nichita, Anca; Olsen, Jerome; Kogler, Christoph; Kirchler, Erich; Hoelzl, Erik; Weiss, Avi; Torgler, Benno; Fooken, Jonas; Fuller, Joanne; Schaffner, Markus; Banuri, Sheheryar; Hassanein, Medhat; Alarcón-García, Gloria; Aldemir, Ceyhan; Apostol, Oana; Weinberg, Diana Bank; Batrancea, Ioan; Belianin, Alexis; Gómez, Felipe de Jesús Bello; Briguglio, Marie; Dermol, Valerij; Doyle, Elaine; Gcabo, Rebone; Gong, Binglin; Ennya, Sara; Essel-Anderson, Anthony; Frecknall-Hughes, Jane; Hasanain, Ali; Hizen, Yoichi; Huber, Odilo; Kaplanoglou, Georgia; Kudła, Janusz; Lemoine, Jérémy E.; Leurcharusmee, Supanika; Matthiasson, Thorolfur; Mehta, Sanjeev; Min, Sejin; Naufal, George; Niskanen, Mervi; Nordblom, Katarina; Öztürk, Engin Bağış; Pacheco, Luis; Pántya, József; Rapanos, Vassilis; Roland-Lévy, Christine; Roux-Cesar, Ana Maria; Salamzadeh, Aidin; Savadori, Lucia; Schei, Vidar; Sharma, Manoj; Summers, Barbara; Suriya, Komsan; Tran, Quoc; Villegas-Palacio, Clara; Visser, Martine; Xia, Chun; Yi, Sunghwan; Zukauskas, Sarunas.

In: Journal of Economic Psychology, 2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations

AU - Batrancea, Larissa

AU - Nichita, Anca

AU - Olsen, Jerome

AU - Kogler, Christoph

AU - Kirchler, Erich

AU - Hoelzl, Erik

AU - Weiss, Avi

AU - Torgler, Benno

AU - Fooken, Jonas

AU - Fuller, Joanne

AU - Schaffner, Markus

AU - Banuri, Sheheryar

AU - Hassanein, Medhat

AU - Alarcón-García, Gloria

AU - Aldemir, Ceyhan

AU - Apostol, Oana

AU - Weinberg, Diana Bank

AU - Batrancea, Ioan

AU - Belianin, Alexis

AU - Gómez, Felipe de Jesús Bello

AU - Briguglio, Marie

AU - Dermol, Valerij

AU - Doyle, Elaine

AU - Gcabo, Rebone

AU - Gong, Binglin

AU - Ennya, Sara

AU - Essel-Anderson, Anthony

AU - Frecknall-Hughes, Jane

AU - Hasanain, Ali

AU - Hizen, Yoichi

AU - Huber, Odilo

AU - Kaplanoglou, Georgia

AU - Kudła, Janusz

AU - Lemoine, Jérémy E.

AU - Leurcharusmee, Supanika

AU - Matthiasson, Thorolfur

AU - Mehta, Sanjeev

AU - Min, Sejin

AU - Naufal, George

AU - Niskanen, Mervi

AU - Nordblom, Katarina

AU - Öztürk, Engin Bağış

AU - Pacheco, Luis

AU - Pántya, József

AU - Rapanos, Vassilis

AU - Roland-Lévy, Christine

AU - Roux-Cesar, Ana Maria

AU - Salamzadeh, Aidin

AU - Savadori, Lucia

AU - Schei, Vidar

AU - Sharma, Manoj

AU - Summers, Barbara

AU - Suriya, Komsan

AU - Tran, Quoc

AU - Villegas-Palacio, Clara

AU - Visser, Martine

AU - Xia, Chun

AU - Yi, Sunghwan

AU - Zukauskas, Sarunas

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

AB - The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

U2 - 10.1016/j.joep.2019.102191

DO - 10.1016/j.joep.2019.102191

M3 - Article

JO - Journal of Economic Psychology

JF - Journal of Economic Psychology

SN - 0167-4870

ER -