Two challenges to the embodied version of the autopoietic theory

María Jimena Clavel Vázquez*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/Letter to the editorScientificpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

“In Are living beings extended autopoietic systems? An embodied reply”, Villalobos and Razeto-Barry offer an articulation of the embodied aspect of the autopoietic theory. Their aim is to block the extended interpretation of this theory. For them, living beings are, simply put, autopoietic bodies. In this commentary, I advance two concerns regarding the alleged cases of extended living beings. On the one hand, I argue that their proposal fails to account for the intuitive difference between these cases and living beings that are embedded in the environment. On the other hand, I argue that, from the perspective offered by the authors, there also seems to be a problem in the way the boundaries of a system are delineated.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)41-42
Number of pages2
JournalAdaptive Behavior
Volume28
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Feb 2020

Keywords

  • Autopoiesis
  • enactivism
  • extended autopoietic systems
  • extended cognition

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