Uncertainty in a Fishery Management Game

J.C. Engwerda

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze the consequences of taking noise into account in a simple twoperson fishery management game.Both a stochastic and deterministic formulation are considered.Compared to the noise-free model it is shown that the used stochastic frameworkhas no implications for the equilibrium actions, whereas in the deterministic formulation as well the number of as the equilibrium actions themselves depend on the model parameters.The various equilibrium actions predicted using the deterministic frameworkseem to be quite plausible.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages14
Volume2005-36
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2005-36

Fingerprint

Uncertainty
Management games
Fisheries management

Keywords

  • linear quadratic differential games
  • feedback information structure
  • soft-constrained Nash equilibrium
  • infinite planning horizon

Cite this

Engwerda, J. C. (2005). Uncertainty in a Fishery Management Game. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-36). Tilburg: Macroeconomics.
Engwerda, J.C. / Uncertainty in a Fishery Management Game. Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2005. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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author = "J.C. Engwerda",
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Engwerda, JC 2005 'Uncertainty in a Fishery Management Game' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2005-36, Macroeconomics, Tilburg.

Uncertainty in a Fishery Management Game. / Engwerda, J.C.

Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2005. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-36).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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AB - In this paper we analyze the consequences of taking noise into account in a simple twoperson fishery management game.Both a stochastic and deterministic formulation are considered.Compared to the noise-free model it is shown that the used stochastic frameworkhas no implications for the equilibrium actions, whereas in the deterministic formulation as well the number of as the equilibrium actions themselves depend on the model parameters.The various equilibrium actions predicted using the deterministic frameworkseem to be quite plausible.

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KW - feedback information structure

KW - soft-constrained Nash equilibrium

KW - infinite planning horizon

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Engwerda JC. Uncertainty in a Fishery Management Game. Tilburg: Macroeconomics. 2005. (CentER Discussion Paper).