Uncertainty, possibility and causal power in QCA

Uncertainty undermines causal claims; however, the nature of causal claims
decides what counts as relevant uncertainty. Empirical robustness is
imperative in regularity theories of causality. Regularity theory features
strongly in QCA, making its case sensitivity a weakness. Following qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA) founder Charles Ragin’s emphasis on ontological
realism, this article suggests causality as a power and thus breaks with
the ontological determinism of regularity theories. Exercising causal powers
makes it possible for human agents to achieve an outcome but does not
determine that they will. The article explains how QCA’s truth table analysis
“models” possibilistic uncertainty and how crisp sets do this better than fuzzy
sets. Causal power is at the heart of critical realist philosophy of science. Like
Ragin, critical realism suggests empirical analysis as merely describing
underlying causal relationships. Empirical statements must be substantively
interpreted into causal claims. The article is critical of “empiricist” QCA that
infers causality from the robustness of set relationships.