Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis

J.W. Albrecht, J.C. van Ours

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

263 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis.If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants.We nd that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages20
Volume2001-49
Publication statusPublished - 2001

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2001-49

Keywords

  • education
  • labour demand

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Albrecht, J. W., & van Ours, J. C. (2001). Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2001-49). Macroeconomics.