Using Experimental Evidence to Design Optimal Notice and Takedown Process

Lenka Fiala, Martin Husovec

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

Whether it is copyright infringement or hate speech, Internet intermediaries like Facebook, Twitter or YouTube are expected to enforce the law by removing illegal content. The legal scheme under which a lot of such delegated enforcement takes place is often referred to as notice & takedown. According to theory and empirical evidence, this scheme leads to many false positives due to over-notification by concerned parties, over-compliance by providers, and under-assertion of rights by affected content creators. We re-create these problems in a laboratory and then test a mechanism to address two of them: the over-compliance by providers, and the lack of complaints by the content creators. We show that our proposed solution of an independent ADR mechanism significantly reduces over-compliance by providers. At the same time, it increases complaints by the content creators who are successful in their complaints, but primarily in cases in which it is easier to evaluate who is right.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherSSRN
Number of pages19
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2018

Publication series

NameTILEC Discussion Paper
Volume2018-028

Keywords

  • notice and takedown
  • copyright
  • experiment

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