Vertical governance change and product differentiation under decreasing component costs

B. Vermeulen, K.J.M. Huisman, A.G. de Kok

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In deciding on whether and when to outsource component production, firms should consider the trade-off between total production costs and the ability to horizontally differentiate products. We study the outsourcing decision in a duopoly under decreasing but uncertain market rates for components, given that outsourcing increases the substitutability of the final products. We find that there is at least one firm that eventually outsources component production because it cannot differentiate its product enough by in-house production to justify the (eventually) higher costs. The follower outsources at a lower market rate or may even remain vertically integrated. The follower thus incurs the (eventually) much higher in-house component costs longer, while the low substitutability is enjoyed by both firms. Under endogenous roles, firms thus engage in a preemption game to be the first to outsource. We also find that firms generally outsource at lower market rates if uncertainty is higher, but seek to preempt at remarkably higher market rates if substitutability remains low
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)65-76
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume57
Early online date29 May 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

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Product Differentiation
Governance
Vertical
Outsourcing
Costs
Differentiate
Preemption
Justify
Trade-offs
Business
Product differentiation
Game
Uncertainty
Market
Substitutability

Cite this

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Vertical governance change and product differentiation under decreasing component costs. / Vermeulen, B.; Huisman, K.J.M.; Kok, A.G. de.

In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 57, 2015, p. 65-76.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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