Abstract
This paper develops a simple model of firm entry, competition, and exit in oligopolistic markets. It features toughness of competition, sunk entry costs, and market-level demand and cost shocks, but assumes that firms' expected payoffs are identical when entry and survival decisions are made.
We prove that this model has an essentially unique symmetric Markov-perfect
equilibrium, and we provide an algorithm for its computation. Because this algorithm only requires finding the fixed points of a finite sequence of contraction mappings, it is guaranteed to converge quickly.
We prove that this model has an essentially unique symmetric Markov-perfect
equilibrium, and we provide an algorithm for its computation. Because this algorithm only requires finding the fixed points of a finite sequence of contraction mappings, it is guaranteed to converge quickly.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | CentER, Center for Economic Research |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Volume | 2017-020 |
| Publication status | Published - 31 Mar 2017 |
Publication series
| Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2017-020 |
Keywords
- demand uncertainty
- dynamic oligopoly
- firm entry and exit
- sunk costs
- toughness of competition