Voters’ commitment problem and the timing of welfare-program reforms

D.A. Hollanders, B. Vis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

When will a vote-seeking government pursue unpopular welfare reforms that are likely to cost it votes? Using a game-theoretical model, we show that a government enacts reforms that are unpopular with the median voter during bad economic times, but not during good ones. The key reason is that voters cannot commit to re-elect a government that does not reform during bad times. This voters’ commitment problem stems from economic voting, i.e., voters’ tendency to punish the government for a poorly performing economy. The voter commitment problem provides an explanation for the empirical puzzle that governments sometimes enact reforms that voters oppose.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)433-448
JournalPublic Choice
Volume155
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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reform program
voter
welfare
commitment
reform
government reform
voting
economics
economy
Commitment problem
Government
Welfare programs
Voters
costs
Vote
time

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Hollanders, D.A. ; Vis, B. / Voters’ commitment problem and the timing of welfare-program reforms. In: Public Choice. 2013 ; Vol. 155, No. 3-4. pp. 433-448.
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Voters’ commitment problem and the timing of welfare-program reforms. / Hollanders, D.A.; Vis, B.

In: Public Choice, Vol. 155, No. 3-4, 2013, p. 433-448.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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