Voters' Commitment Problem and Welfare-Program Reforms

D.A. Hollanders, B. Vis

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper proposes that reforms by vote-seeking governments and the existence of reform-adverse voters are logically compatible. This results from a commitment problem on the part of voters. Due to economic voting voters cannot credibly commit to reelect a non-reforming government during a recession. The empirical implication of this voter commitment mechanism is that governments only adopt visible welfare-program reforms during economic lows, which is what the empirical political-economic literature has established.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages28
Volume2009-93
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2009-93

Fingerprint

Commitment problem
Government
Welfare programs
Voters
Vote
Economic reform
Recession
Economic voting
Political economics

Keywords

  • Commitment
  • Political Economy
  • Reform
  • Welfare-Programs

Cite this

Hollanders, D. A., & Vis, B. (2009). Voters' Commitment Problem and Welfare-Program Reforms. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-93). Tilburg: Macroeconomics.
Hollanders, D.A. ; Vis, B. / Voters' Commitment Problem and Welfare-Program Reforms. Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Hollanders, DA & Vis, B 2009 'Voters' Commitment Problem and Welfare-Program Reforms' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2009-93, Macroeconomics, Tilburg.

Voters' Commitment Problem and Welfare-Program Reforms. / Hollanders, D.A.; Vis, B.

Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-93).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Hollanders DA, Vis B. Voters' Commitment Problem and Welfare-Program Reforms. Tilburg: Macroeconomics. 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper).